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CONSTRUCTING A NEW AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 
Keith E. Whittington* 
Problems of constitutional interpretation have occupied a 
prominent part of the scholarly agenda for quite some time, and 
rightly so. Theories of constitutional interpretation help guide 
and legitimate the work of the judiciary. They grapple directly 
with what the courts say they do and with many of the issues that 
lawyers routinely face. Understanding what should be 
interpreted, how it should be interpreted, and who has the 
authority to interpret are all important and basic to the 
constitutional enterprise.1 
Interpretation is not all that we do with constitutions, 
however. Interpretive practice is supplemented through a 
process of constitutional construction. Constitutional scholarship 
has given increasing attention to the idea of construction as a 
feature of the constitutional enterprise that is distinct from 
interpretation and that is worthy of analysis in its own right. 
In this Article, I reintroduce the concept, clarify a couple of 
features of the idea of constitutional constructions as I 
understand it, and suggest some possible benefits of 
constructions as a conceptual tool. The Article proceeds first by 
discussing what constitutional construction is and how it relates 
to constitutional interpretation. Part II considers the extent to 
which courts engage in constitutional constructions. Part III 
considers whether it is possible to avoid constitutional 
constructions. The Article concludes by suggesting ways in which 
the concept can be useful to various scholarly literatures. 
 
 *  William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics, Princeton University. 
 1. See Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret?: The Quest for an Ultimate 
Constitutional Interpreter, 48 REV. POL. 401, 401 (1986). 
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I. WHAT IS A CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION? 
Constitutional construction is one mechanism by which 
constitutional meaning is elaborated. It works alongside 
constitutional interpretation to elaborate the existing 
constitutional order. The process of constitutional construction is 
concerned with fleshing out constitutional principles, practices 
and rules that are not visible on the face of the constitutional 
text and that are not readily implicit in the terms of the 
constitution. 
We can imagine a continuum of actions that political actors 
can take under a Constitution, ranging from policymaking to 
revolution. At one end of the continuum, political actors can 
take constitutional forms as a given and make policy decisions 
under it, filling government offices and exercising government 
power in (constitutionally) noncontroversial ways. Policymaking 
seeks to exercise constitutional authority, and its implications for 
elaborating or altering constitutional meaning are only implicit. 
At the other end of the spectrum, political actors can engage in 
revolution and replace the existing constitutional order or 
document wholesale in favor of a new one. The Articles of 
Confederation can be displaced in favor of the U.S. Constitution. 
Less extreme than revolution is creation, which adds new text to 
a preexisting Constitution. Creation embraces a revisionary 
authority, but the revisions are partial rather than total. They 
amend and reform the Constitution, rather than throw it over.2 
Interpretation and construction are both concerned with 
elaborating, developing and effectuating the preexisting 
Constitution. Unlike the mere policymaker, the interpreter or 
constructor engages the Constitution directly and attempts to 
address and resolve contested claims about constitutional 
meaning. But political actors engaged in these tasks do not claim 
the authority to revise, amend or alter the Constitution. They 
claim only the lesser authority of attempting to understand and 
realize the Constitution as they found it. 
Construction lies closer along the continuum to the process 
of creation, however. Construction picks up where interpretation 
leaves off. Interpretation attempts to divine the meaning of the 
text.3 There will be occasions, however, when the Constitution as 
 
 2. See also KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 3–5 
(1999). 
 3. For these purposes, I bracket the issue of how best to interpret a constitutional 
text. One can accept a fairly capacious understanding of the interpretive process and still 
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written cannot in good faith be said to provide a determinate 
answer to a given question. This is the realm of construction. 
The process of interpretation may be able to constrain the 
available readings of the text and limit the permissible set of 
political options, but the interpreter may not be able to say that 
the text demands a specific result. Further judgments, further 
choices, about how to proceed within those bounds are made 
through the process of construction. Constitutional meaning is 
no longer discovered at that point. It is built. 
But constitutional constructions are built within the 
boundaries, or to use Jack Balkin’s phrase, within the 
framework, of the interpreted Constitution.4 They partake of the 
process of constitutional creation in the sense that constructions 
are necessarily creative, but not in the sense that they have the 
authority to revise the constitutional text or the discoverable 
meaning of that text. The process of construction takes over 
when the traditional tools of interpretation exhaust themselves. 
In order to do so, those who construct constitutional meaning 
must lean more heavily on external considerations to bring 
determinacy to what interpretative arguments leave 
indeterminate. Put differently, constitutional constructions make 
normative appeals about what the Constitution should be, 
melding what is known about the Constitution with what is 
desired. 
Constructions are, by their nature, temporary. An 
interpretation of a text attempts to capture the true meaning of 
the text. Any interpretation will be revisable in light of later 
argument and evidence. Any interpretation is likely to be partial, 
since it will be motivated by a particular question and 
controversy, and thus may highlight some features of 
constitutional meaning while pushing others into the 
background. Interpretations aim to be accurate extensions of the 
fixed text. Interpretations should, therefore, be enduring except 
to the extent to which there is more to be said about them or 
they can be made more accurate. By contrast, constructions are 
 
make room for a supplementary and distinguishable process of construction. As long as 
an interpretive approach is capable of recognizing gaps and indeterminacies in 
constitutional meaning, then it is capable of recognizing the value of constitutional 
constructions. As a result, I would resist tying the concept of constitutional constructions 
to any specific controversial claim about what interpretation means or how best to 
interpret. Cf. Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 95 (2010). 
 4. Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. 
U. L. REV. 549 (2009). 
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meant to settle indeterminacies to the satisfaction of immediate 
political interests. Constructions involve judgments and choices 
about how best to resolve those indeterminacies. Those choices 
can be revisited without disturbing the constitutional text itself 
or the discoverable meaning of the constitutional text. If a 
construction no longer serves the interests or expresses the 
values of important political actors, then it can and often will be 
revisited. A successful constitutional construction may span 
centuries, or merely a political generation. We currently think 
we know the answer to such basic questions as whether a state 
has a right to secede from the union or whether the Senate’s 
“advice and consent” function can be exercised entirely through 
post-negotiation treaty ratification or whether presidents can 
appropriately veto legislation on policy grounds, but those 
answers depend on settlements that could, in the right 
circumstances, be undone. Those constitutional resolutions may 
be venerable, but they reflect contingent choices made within 
the constitutional framework not essential requirements of the 
Constitution itself. 
Let me give three illustrative examples of situations in 
which constructions might play a role in constitutional practice. 
This set of examples is not intended to be exhaustive, but to 
clarify what constructions are and how they fit within the 
continuum of actions that can be taken under a Constitution.5 In 
particular, the examples highlight the relationship between 
interpretation and construction. Constructions occur in the 
context of textual vagueness, constitutional gaps, and 
constitutional inspirations. 
First, constitutional vagueness occurs when there is 
uncertainty as to where exactly the boundaries of a 
constitutional rule, standard or principle might be. Some 
constitutional rules may have precise boundaries, leaving little 
uncertainty or vagueness about what is covered by the rule and 
what is excluded. Others may have indeterminacies at their 
boundaries. Interpretation may be able to help specify what rule 
a constitutional provision seeks to convey and identify the core 
meaning of a term, but the meaning of a term as it might apply in 
more marginal contexts may be underdetermined. 
A number of constitutional provisions and principles are 
vague to some degree. They have a clear core of meaning, which 
provides ready answers for many questions about how the 
 
 5. See also WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, at 8–9. 
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provisions ought to be applied. Interpreters would be capable of 
recognizing government actions that are permissible and those 
that are impermissible. But some questions, including some 
questions of immediate political importance, might fall in 
between, where it is unclear whether government action is 
permissible or impermissible. We might, for example, agree with 
many nineteenth-century commentators in thinking that the 
Interstate Commerce Clause had clear and determinate meaning 
about some things. Commercial transactions across state 
boundaries and the transportation of economic goods across 
state boundaries were within the core meaning of interstate 
commerce. They were “paradigm cases” of the rule embodied in 
the commerce clause.6 On the other hand, commentators widely 
agreed that the federal regulation of manufacturing was outside 
the bounds of the Interstate Commerce Clause. Between these 
two areas of relative interpretive clarity were areas of relative 
indeterminacy. Did, for example, the Interstate Commerce 
Clause by implication disempower the states from interfering 
with interstate commerce? When did goods pass from the realm 
of interstate commerce to the realm of intrastate commerce? 
Once the limits of interpretation are reached, further textual 
analysis or historical inquiry or structuralist argument may 
provide grist for the mill but they will not resolve the 
indeterminacy. Within that zone of construction, choices will 
have to be made as to how best to realize the constitutional 
project going forward. 
Second, constitutional gaps occur when the constitutional 
text provides no clear instruction for resolving important 
constitutional issues. Such “gaps” may be the product either of 
genuine oversight by constitutional drafters or of delegation to 
future political decision-makers. While interpretation is 
ultimately about discovering the meaning implicit in the text that 
is there, construction is concerned with addressing constitutional 
subject matter and resolving indeterminacies. If a given 
Constitution fails to make adequate provision for a given 
action—or simply leaves some decisions to be made by political 
actors operating through conventional political means—
construction fills the gap. Arguably, the removal power is an 
instance of such a gap. The U.S. Constitution specifies how 
executive branch officials are to be appointed, but does not 
 
 6. JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY 15 (2005). I do not mean to 
embrace all of Rubenfeld’s approach to thinking about the structure of constitutional 
law, but his language is useful here. 
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specify how they are to be removed from office, except by 
impeachment. The First Congress puzzled over several 
alternatives as to how officers might be removed and how such 
removals might be constitutionally justified. The statutes 
creating the Cabinet departments settled on unilateral 
presidential removal, but there was little agreement in Congress 
over the rationale behind that settlement.7 A removal power is a 
requisite part of the constitutional scheme. Although there are 
interpretive arguments that can dissolve the apparent 
constitutional gap in this particular case,8 the eventual statutory 
settlement in favor of a unilateral presidential removal power 
can be readily understood as a relatively successful constitutional 
construction to resolve a textual indeterminacy in a workable 
and normatively attractive way. Somewhat differently, the 
decisions to have individual citizens vote to select presidential 
electors or to elect members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives by single-member geographic districts fill out 
the effective meaning of the U.S. Constitution and the 
functioning scheme of government. In those cases, the 
Constitution leaves to state legislative discretion how 
presidential electors will be chosen and how House members 
will be elected. In both cases, the “gap” has since been filled in 
with substantive content, severely limiting legislative discretion. 
Our working Constitution is one in which citizens choose their 
electors (and the electors exercise no autonomy) and House 
members represent single-member districts. 
Third, constitutional inspirations occur when political actors 
take constitutional requirements as their starting points and seek 
to supplement them. The constitutional text, alongside other 
documents, can be a source of political inspiration. Its terms and 
provisions can help support, legitimate, and mobilize demands 
for reform and action. Political inspiration is not the same thing 
as interpretation, however, and calls for action may outrun what 
a careful interpreter would say that the constitutional text can 
support or require. Construction can supplement what 
interpretation provides. Constitutional rights provisions are the 
 
 7. See Keith E. Whittington, The Separation of Powers at the Founding, in 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 11 (Katy J. Harriger ed., 2003). 
 8. Interpretive claims could be made, for example, that the Constitution positively 
precludes anyone from removing executive officers through any mechanism other than 
impeachment or that presidential removal is implicit in the “executive power” of Article 
II. Likewise, it would be an interpretive claim to contend that Congress had freedom to 
legislate on this subject via the Necessary And Proper Clause. The specific path that 
Congress chose to take (unilateral presidential removal) was an act of construction. 
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easiest example.9 Rights provisions give rise to a political 
rhetoric and mobilization aimed at defending and expanding the 
scope of those rights. Statutes, executive actions and judicial 
decisions expanding civil rights and liberties build not only on 
interpretations of what constitutional provisions require but also 
on ideas about what rights individuals ought to have in 
contemporary society. Assume arguendo that, properly 
interpreted, the First Amendment does not protect seditious 
libel, the Second Amendment does not protect individual gun 
ownership, that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit 
execution by firing squad, or that the Thirteenth Amendment 
does not apply to “wage slavery” and require rights of collective 
bargaining. There is nothing that prevents citizens from 
mobilizing around those more expansive ideas of their rights and 
government officials from acting to recognize and effectuate 
those ideas. The knowing lawyer might well say that the 
Thirteenth Amendment does not mean that labor organizing is 
entitled to constitutional protection, but the labor activist or 
legislator might well argue that protections for labor are 
necessary for realizing the requirements and promise of the 
Thirteenth Amendment.10 
II. COURTS AND CONSTRUCTIONS 
Who should construct the Constitution? What role do 
courts play in constructing the Constitution? These are two 
distinguishable questions about the relationship between courts 
and constitutional construction. One raises normative issues 
about whether and under what circumstances courts should 
engage in constitutional construction. The other raises empirical 
questions about whether courts have in fact been active players 
in offering and developing constructions that have shaped our 
constitutional understandings and practices. I have not spent 
much time, in those terms, pursuing the descriptive account of 
how courts have actively constructed constitutional meaning 
over time. It would not be a difficult task to show that the courts 
 
 9. This process can obviously produce more difficult dynamics as well from the 
perspective of interpretive constitutional fidelity. The debate over Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment points to exactly these issues. 
 10. On the latter, see James Gray Pope, Thirteenth Amendment versus the 
Commerce Clause: Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921-1957, 
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2002); REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY 63–94 
(2006). 
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have engaged in what I call the process of construction.11 The 
more interesting immediate questions are the normative ones. 
Some of those who have embraced the interpretation-
construction distinction are also comfortable with the courts 
actively engaging in construction. For Randy Barnett, one of the 
virtues of the interpretation-construction distinction is that it 
allows us to recognize that when we reach the boundaries of 
interpretation the meaning of the text may still be 
underdetermined and need to be supplemented. With Dworkin, 
Barnett would call on the courts to construct the Constitution so 
that it is the “best it can be” so as to enhance its legitimacy and 
promote liberty.12 Somewhat differently, Jack Balkin makes no 
distinction between courts and other institutions that might 
engage in the process of construction. Every governmental 
institution—as well as a variety of nongovernmental actors—is 
equally engaged in the process of creating the “living 
constitution.” Courts may not have the most important role to 
play in Balkin’s theory, but they are equally able to interpret or 
construct constitutional meaning.13 
I have been more skeptical about the use of construction by 
the courts. I initially argued: 
The judiciary should seek to enforce the correct 
interpretation of the Constitution, but it should also avoid 
enforcing even venerable constructions. This caution does not 
require that the judiciary identify constructions per se, only 
that it keep its eye on interpreting the Constitution while 
simultaneously bearing in mind the possibility of 
constitutional indeterminacy. The judiciary should not prop 
up old constructions that are no longer politically 
authoritative, and it should avoid stifling the development of 
new constructions by placing the judicial imprimatur on the 
old and contributing to its hegemonic status. Constructions 
claim the fidelity of political actors through their continuing 
 
 11. My recent work has been concerned, in part, with examining why courts are so 
prominent in American constitutionalism given the importance of extrajudicial actors in 
constitutional constructions. The importance of extrajudicial constitutional action to our 
system does not mean that there will not also be a lot judicially produced constitutional 
law. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 
(2007). 
 12. Randy Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 646 
(1999) (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 62 (1986)); see also RANDY 
BARNETT, THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 118–27 (2004). 
 13. Balkin, supra note 4, at 559. 
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political authority, not through judicial enforcement.14 
My concern was with what Robert Cover characterized as the 
“jurispathic” quality of courts and the possibility that judiciary 
would artificially limit the development of new constructions.15 
Moreover, the authority of the courts to construct 
constitutional meaning would not necessarily stand on the same 
footing as their authority to interpret the Constitution. One of 
the starting points for my earlier explorations of originalism and 
theories of constitutional interpretation was a concern for 
justifying the practice of judicial review. I, at least, am satisfied 
that courts can assert an authority to nullify the actions of other 
government officials when judges act on behalf of constitutional 
interpretations.16 Constructions present a different problem. 
They are “essentially political.”17 The arguments that justify 
judicial review on the basis of interpretation are not satisfactory 
to demonstrate that the courts should also exercise judicial 
review on the on the basis of constitutional constructions. It is, I 
believe, a harder case to make out that courts should have the 
authority to trump the actions of elected officials merely on the 
basis of constitutional constructions.18 
Despite such concerns, I have always recognized some role 
for the courts in engaging in constitutional construction. Most 
fundamentally, the power of judicial review itself is plausibly 
understood as a construction of the Constitution. Similarly, the 
ways in which the courts ought to exercise the power of judicial 
review are not a matter to be resolved by constitutional 
interpretation. Standards of deference, methods of constitutional 
interpretation, and the like are themselves ultimately a matter of 
constitutional construction. The argument that judges should 
generally limit themselves to enforcing interpretations, that 
judges should be originalists, or that judges should adopt a clear 
mistake rule when exercising judicial review would be a claim 
about how an indeterminate feature of the constitutional scheme 
ought to be settled. Judges would not be alone in developing, 
establishing and maintaining such constructions, but they would 
necessarily play a central role. Other, more substantively 
 
 14. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 11 (1999). 
 15. Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40 (1983). 
 16. See Whittington, supra note 14, at 46–50. 
 17. WHITTINGTON, supra note 14, at 6. 
 18. See Keith E. Whittington, The Death of the Legalized Constitution and the 
Specter of Judicial Review, in THE COURTS AND THE CULTURE WARS (Bradley C. 
Watson & Gary M. Quinlivan eds., 2002). 
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particular constructions may be particularly appropriate to the 
judiciary, either because of their institutional focus or because of 
their subject matter. The federal exclusionary rule and the 
Miranda requirements can be understood as efforts at 
construction, building out the effective requirements of 
constitutional provisions beyond what the text strictly speaking 
means. Judicial constructions would encompass some of what 
Mitch Berman has characterized as “decision rules” or what 
Dick Fallon has characterized as constitutional 
“implementation.”19 
It would thus be overstated to think of the interpretation-
construction distinction strictly in institutional terms. 
Constitutional interpretation may put the judiciary on the 
strongest footing for exercising the power of judicial review and 
overturning the actions of other government officials, but there 
are circumstances in which judges like other political actors 
might engage in constitutional construction. When doing so, they 
are undertaking a particularly political task, a creative task 
involving normative choices in a realm of constitutional 
indeterminacies. Their particular expertise and institutional 
authority as judges is undoubtedly lessened when operating in 
the zone of construction than when on the firmer, traditionally 
legal ground of interpretation. There are occasions when such 
actions are unavoidable, as when determining how the power of 
judicial review ought to be exercised, and judicial constructions 
of the Constitution are unlikely to occur in isolation from the 
deliberations of other political actors. But there are other 
occasions when judicial constructions are, in principle, more 
avoidable. 
I have been persuaded over time that there is more room 
for courts in developing and maintaining constitutional 
constructions than I initially suggested. I am not inclined to think 
of every instance of a judicial doctrine or application of a 
constitutional rule as a “construction” of constitutional meaning, 
but there certainly is space to recognize some judicial doctrines 
as efforts at filling in the constitutional framework.20 Somewhat 
 
 19. Mitchell Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004); see 
also RICHARD H. FALLON JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001). 
 20. At one level, the question of labels makes little difference, and whether judicial 
doctrine as such is usefully labeled as a “constitutional construction” or viewed as 
parallel to or continuous with other phenomenon of that type is ultimately a matter of 
analytical pragmatism. My tentative inclination is to view, for example, the three-part 
Lemon test or the stream of commerce doctrine less as constructions than as bureaucratic 
guidelines. Having construed the meaning of the relevant constitutional provision, the 
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more problematic but empirically common is the possibility of 
courts being called upon to implement, extend, and rationalize 
constitutional constructions that are more widely shared by 
government officials in the political system generally. As the 
neo-Dahlian literature has highlighted, the relationship of the 
courts to the other branches of government is often not strictly 
countermajoritarian. Instead, the courts often act as partners 
with other government officials to implement a common 
constitutional vision, with judges sometimes acting when and 
where it is politically inconvenient or infeasible for elected 
officials to do so.21 In that context, many political actors may 
welcome the courts stepping in to construct constitutional 
meaning, resolve indeterminacies, and maintain consensual 
values in specific cases. The difficulty arises, however, when that 
process becomes less consensual and power and influence shifts 
into the courts. So long as judges are acting as faithful agents to 
provisionally maintain constitutional understandings widely 
shared by other political actors, then their role in articulating 
constitutional constructions may not be objectionable. As they 
become innovators on behalf of constitutional understandings 
that are not widely shared by other political actors, then the 
legitimacy of courts engaging in constitutional construction 
would seem to be limited. 
III. AVOIDING CONSTRUCTIONS?22 
It might be thought that constitutional construction is 
entirely avoidable, that the constitutional system could operate 
entirely in the realm of constitutional interpretation. If so, then 
we might think that constitutional constructions are a choice 
made by political actors who seek to expand their own influence 
and discretionary authority. Rather than limiting themselves to 
 
Court in subsequent cases is less concerned with grappling with constitutional meaning 
than with articulating a set of secondary rules that adequately embody those 
constitutional understandings and that can be enforced by and against other government 
officials. Judicial doctrines are one of the routine policy implications that might be 
expected from the process of engaging in constitutional interpretation and construction.  
 21. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL 
SUPREMACY (2007); Howard Gillman, Courts and the Politics of Partisan Coalitions, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS (Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel 
Kelemen, & Gregory A. Caldeira eds., 2008); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian 
Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993); 
Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National 
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957). 
 22. I am grateful to Gary Lawson for raising the issues discussed in this section. 
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constitutional interpretation, political actors may choose to 
engage in constitutional construction. 
How might this work? We might imagine constitutional 
constructions are avoidable in two types of circumstances. The 
first possibility is that a Constitution might be written such that 
its terms are entirely clear, complete and determinate. A 
sufficiently clear and comprehensive constitutional document 
would render constitutional construction unnecessary. All 
constitutional issues could be addressed by reference to 
interpretation of the text. In practice, no text will have that 
degree of clarity or comprehensiveness. There will always be 
points of indeterminacy or new constitutional practices, 
institutions or principles that will be developed beyond what is 
specified in the text. The U.S. Constitution may seem to create 
more room for construction because of its inclusion of abstract 
phrases and its relative difficulty of amendment, but even a 
constitutional document that emphasized specific rules and that 
was easy to amend would be supplemented by a host of statutes, 
decisions, and practices that would create a working 
constitutional system. In practice, every Constitution is a 
“framework,” not a “skyscraper.”23 
The second possibility is that constitutional constructions 
are precluded by baseline assumptions. If the constitutional 
system had a sufficient set of default assumptions in place, then 
any constitutional indeterminacies might be resolvable. Two 
familiar default rules might be mentioned. The clear mistake 
rule indicates that judges should defer to legislatures and uphold 
a law unless its unconstitutionality is very clear. The principle of 
strict construction of enumerated powers indicates that Congress 
should have to be able to positively demonstrate that it possesses 
a power under the Constitution in order to exercise it, otherwise 
the power is retained by the states. It might well be possible in 
the case of all constitutional controversies to identify a default 
rule that would indicate which side should prevail in the case of 
interpretive indeterminacy. Rather than constructing a new 
substantive answer in a constitutional controversy, we might 
think the appropriate response is to recur to the default rule and 
do nothing more than interpret the Constitution. 
There are at least three responses to this concern about 
default rules and whether they render constitutional 
constructions unnecessary. First, we should recall that the zone 
 
 23. Balkin, supra note 4, at 550. 
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of construction is properly delimited by constitutional 
interpretation. Constructions cannot be used to alter, revise or 
amend the constitutional text, properly interpreted. If one 
concern about the interpretation-constructions distinction is that 
it becomes a vehicle for exploiting constitutional indeterminacies 
in order to expand judicial power or the scope of federal 
authority, then this misconstrues the role of construction vis-à-
vis interpretation. If interpretation determines that the 
production of goods is outside the scope of the Interstate 
Commerce Clause, for example, then construction cannot alter 
that conclusion and expand federal regulatory authority. The 
idea of construction does not authorize government officials to 
contradict the constitutional text and its understood meaning. 
The idea of construction describes how political actors work 
within and around that constitutional skeleton. 
Second, for the most part default rules are themselves best 
understood as constructions. The Constitution provides 
relatively little guidance for most default rules that we might 
want to develop. A faithful interpreter would be hard-pressed to 
discover a determinate set of default assumptions embedded in 
the Constitution. Nonetheless, default rules are an appropriate 
constitutional subject, and there is a ready set of constitutional 
materials that can be used to construct arguments about what 
kinds of default rules would be most suitable and desirable for a 
country such as ours. Should judges adopt a “clear mistake rule” 
and work with a default that laws are constitutional? Should 
judges adopt a “presumption of liberty” and work with a default 
that laws are constitutionally dubious and require justification? 
Is a strict construction of enumerated powers which assumes that 
national powers that cannot be specifically justified are reserved 
exclusively to the states best in keeping with our federal system? 
Or is a broad construction of national powers that assumes that 
federal power is constitutional unless it conflicts with specific 
prohibitions or cannot be grounded in any reasonable reading of 
a grant of power more appropriate to the national union? It 
would certainly be possible to choose among these, and other, 
default rules, and as a result hem a given political decision-
maker in. Once the default rule is in the place, the decision-
maker knows what to do when she encounters constitutional 
indeterminacy. She knows that policymaking discretion should 
now pass from actor X to actor Y. When in doubt, the court 
should uphold the law (or strike it down); federal power should 
be disfavored (or favored); etc. Putting the default rules in place, 
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however, is not a mechanical or a purely interpretive task. The 
default rules are themselves (properly) part of what political 
actors have struggled over and rearranged over time. They have 
been constructed and reconstructed. Once in place, they can be 
interpreted and applied, but the development of the default rules 
is a task for constitutional construction. 
Third, default rules are most relevant when thinking about 
certain contexts in which constitutional controversies arise. In 
particular, default rules are helpful for dispute resolution and for 
maintaining clean lines of institutional responsibility. If a 
comprehensive set of default rules were to be put in a place 
within a constitutional system, they might reduce the need for 
constitutional construction to deal with indeterminacies on a 
case-by-case basis, but they would not make constructions 
entirely unnecessary. Default rules are unlikely to eliminate all 
indeterminacy. They require further refinement and develop-
ment themselves. That is, once agreement has been reached on 
the big issues, further work must often still be done constructing 
meaning on the margins of the initial settlement and resolving 
remaining indeterminacies. The case of enumerated powers 
provides an example. The old-school Jeffersonians agreed 
among themselves on the importance of strict construction and 
on the basic principles of enumerated powers. They accepted a 
default rule that when in doubt about congressional powers, 
make the assumption that Congress did not have the authority to 
act and that the power was instead reserved to the states. They 
soon disagreed among themselves, however, about where 
sufficient doubt about congressional power crept in. The margins 
of congressional power still needed to be defined. Presidents 
Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe all disagreed among themselves 
over the precise formulation for thinking about the problem of 
federal authority over internal improvements. Within the broad 
contours of strict constructionist thinking, the detailed balancing 
of the needs of state and nation, the competing conceptions of 
state sovereignty and their demands, and the calculus of threats 
posed to the constitutional design and social welfare could lead 
to different conclusions about what specific rules should guide 
policymakers in the case of internal improvements.24 Strict 
constructionism structures and guides constitutional argument 
and decisionmaking. Such default rules do not avoid the need for 
 
 24. See HOWARD GILLMAN, MARK A. GRABER, & KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (forthcoming). 
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further constitutional deliberation and decisionmaking. They 
concentrate and narrow the scope of those deliberations. 
Once we know, whether by default rule or otherwise, that a 
given institutional actor has authority over a set of policy 
decisions, there is still an open question as to how that authority 
ought to be exercised. In many cases, how that authority should 
be exercised is strictly a policy matter and takes place below the 
level of constitutional discourse. In other cases, however, 
constitutional constructions come into play to further constrain 
the discretion of political actors. Constitutional constructions 
may provide substantive content or sets of principled 
considerations that delimit (or free up) how power is to be 
exercised. Conceptualizing constructions simply as a system of 
default rules does not adequately account for or allow political 
actors to avoid making decisions about whether to create a 
tradition of a two-term presidency, whether organized political 
parties should be regarded as legitimate, whether a two-party 
system should be fostered, whether to regard the protective tariff 
as constitutionally illegitimate, or whether literacy tests for 
voting should be regarded as permissible. Default rules may tell 
some government officials to keep out of the way as some 
decisions are being made, but they do not tell political actors 
how those decisions ought to be made. But constitutional 
constructions often are concerned with identifying appropriate 
outcomes. 
Constitutional assumptions and default rules can reduce the 
effort that government officials need to make when they 
encounter particular controversies and uncertainties. In 
particular, default rules might be recommended to minimize the 
extent to which judges actively engage in rendering new 
constitutional constructions when faced with indeterminate 
constitutional meaning. Nonetheless, the idea of constitutional 
constructions is not rendered irrelevant by the possibility of 
default rules. Default rules may alter how political actors 
exercise their responsibilities, but they do not avoid the need for 
supplementing the interpretive process in order to have a fully 
functioning constitutional system. 
IV. WHAT CAN CONSTRUCTIONS DO FOR YOU? 
The interpretation-construction distinction is an academic 
distinction. More particularly, the concept of a constitutional 
construction is an analytical category. The claim is not that this is 
!!!WHITTINGTON-271-CONSTRUCTINGANEWAMERICANCONSTITUTION.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)12/10/2010  10:53 AM 
134 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 27:119 
 
a familiar distinction or that “construction” (used in this way) is 
a familiar idea within American constitutional discourse. 
Political actors engage in the process of construing constitutional 
meaning and creating institutions and practices to accomplish 
their objectives. They do not necessarily conceptualize what they 
do as operating in these terms. The value of recognizing 
constitutional constructions is not in better replicating the 
language of American constitutional practice. The value of 
recognizing the concept (whether under the label “construction” 
or something else) is that it helps the external observer better 
understand how American constitutionalism works. With better 
analytical and empirical understanding, better normative 
theorizing can follow. But as with any conceptual tool, the 
question is whether this one is helpful for performing tasks that 
we might be interested in. 
The interpretation-construction distinction has particular 
utility for originalist normative theory.25 Originalism has faced a 
number of traditional criticisms, and the concept of construction 
helps to build a more compelling response to some of those 
criticisms. Originalism is often accused of being overly rigid, of 
being unable to account for constitutional development, and of 
being unable to grapple with indeterminacy in constitutional 
meaning. Subsuming originalist arguments about constitutional 
interpretation and judicial review within a broader constitutional 
theory that incorporates constitutional constructions alleviates 
those concerns. Originalism qua originalism may provide an 
adequate account of how the Constitution ought to be 
interpreted and how courts ought to exercise the power of 
judicial review, but it may not describe the complete operation 
of the constitutional order. Originalists may benefit from 
recognizing more explicitly that constitutional meaning is 
sometimes indeterminate and that there are limits as to what 
answers constitutional interpretation can provide. The question 
then becomes what should political actors do when 
constitutional interpretation runs out and constitutional 
construction takes over. While some originalists might embrace 
 
 25. The interpretation-construction distinction is often associated with and viewed 
as characteristic of “the new originalism.” It should be emphasized, however, that the 
interpretation-construction distinction is separable from other features of recent 
originalist theorizing. There is nothing about the idea of constitutional constructions, for 
example, that implies a commitment to a semantic meaning approach to originalist 
constitutional interpretation, even if some individual scholars happen to have embraced 
both arguments. On the new originalism, see also Keith E. Whittington, The New 
Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL. 599 (2004). 
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an active role for the courts in at least some circumstances in 
constructing constitutional meaning in the interstices of the 
originalist text, others might demur. Either way, constructions 
provide a bridge between the fixed meaning of the interpreted 
text of the originalist Constitution and the ongoing development 
of constitutional practices, values and rules. Without a notion of 
constitutional construction, originalists are tempted to deny or 
paper over constitutional gaps or indeterminacies and to 
minimize the importance of constitutional developments that do 
not fit the originalist framework. Neither tendency is helpful or 
necessary. 
Making analytical space for constitutional constructions is 
useful for constitutional theorists of a variety of persuasions. 
Originalists have been particularly concerned with (vexed by?) 
the tension between a fixed constitutional text and political 
change and between the interpretive difficulties associated with 
our constitutional text and the desire for answers to our 
contemporary political problems. The idea of constructions 
offers a vocabulary and a toolkit for addressing some of those 
concerns. Constitutional theory writ large has other concerns, 
but the idea of constructions may be useful in addressing some 
of those as well. Constitutional theory does not have a rich 
vocabulary for discussing what political actors do when they 
engage in constitutional argumentation or take action in the 
name of constitutional commitments. Often, any activity having 
to do with the Constitution is simply called “interpretation.” 
Regardless of how one understands interpretation (that is, 
regardless of whether one accepts originalism as either a 
conceptual or normative theory), such a broad category strips 
the term of its analytical utility and obscures the diversity of 
ways in which political actors relate to the Constitution. 
Likewise, to the extent that the idea of interpretation is 
connected to normative theories and used to help legitimate the 
actions of judges, such arguments become more attenuated as 
the notion of interpretation is loosened. The idea of 
constructions can help distinguish the various ways in which 
political actors engage with the Constitution and provide the 
starting point for developing distinctive arguments for justifying 
those various activities. There is nothing about the idea of 
constructions that settles the issue of whether judges, for 
example, should engage in them. Distinguishing between 
interpretation and construction does focus attention on such 
important normative questions as whether (and under what 
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circumstances) judicial judgments should trump legislative 
judgments when constitutional meaning is indeterminate or 
about how constitutional gaps are to be filled. 
Opening the field of constitutional constructions also holds 
some promise for shaping the agenda of empirical inquiry into 
constitutional politics and political development more broadly. 
Constitutional construction is not the only form of constitutional 
politics, but recognizing the importance of constructive activity 
offers a variety of opportunities for expanding the scholarly 
agenda and improving our understanding of the dynamics of 
constitutional development. A concern with constitutional 
interpretation focuses attention on textual analysis, modalities of 
argument, and standards of evidence. An interest in 
constitutional construction calls our attention to the process by 
which new ideas come to the fore, practices are stabilized, and 
institutions are put into place. Although both interpretation and 
construction can occur throughout the political arena, 
interpretive arguments tend to center around the courts. 
Recognizing constitutional constructions potentially decenters 
the scholarly agenda so as to take greater account of the range of 
activity occurring throughout the political sphere by a range of 
actors. Constructions also highlight the process of political and 
constitutional development over time. The constitutional choices 
and debates of today are made within the context of the 
practices, institutions, and ideals that had been built up over 
prior debates and decisions. The study of constitutional 
constructions focuses our attention not only on arguments over 
what the Constitution means but also over how the 
constitutional system works, not only over how the Constitution 
is interpreted but also over how political actors struggle over the 
authority to interpret and what the consequences of past 
constitutional controversies might be for the shape of current 
ones. 
The idea of constitutional constructions can play a role 
within normative constitutional theory, but the starting point is 
to better capture a distinction within constitutional 
argumentation and practice. The ideal of interpretation does not 
adequately represent what judges or political actors often do in 
regard to the Constitution. The effort of discovering what the 
text says is ultimately distinguishable from making choices about 
what to do when the text is silent. Much of our working 
Constitution consists of the choices that we have made in the 
interstices of the interpretable Constitution. Constitutional 
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constructions have supplied rules, practices, and institutions that 
we have found satisfying, even when constitutional 
interpretation had little to offer. They are how we live with a 
written Constitution. 
 
